Zhijian Duan

Jie Fu, Xue Geng, Zhijian Duan et al.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is a common method for transferring the ``knowledge'' learned by one machine learning model (the \textit{teacher}) into another model (the \textit{student}), where typically, the teacher has a greater capacity (e.g., more parameters or higher bit-widths). To our knowledge, existing methods overlook the fact that although the student absorbs extra knowledge from the teacher, both models share the same input data -- and this data is the only medium by which the teacher's knowledge can be demonstrated. Due to the difference in model capacities, the student may not benefit fully from the same data points on which the teacher is trained. On the other hand, a human teacher may demonstrate a piece of knowledge with individualized examples adapted to a particular student, for instance, in terms of her cultural background and interests. Inspired by this behavior, we design data augmentation agents with distinct roles to facilitate knowledge distillation. Our data augmentation agents generate distinct training data for the teacher and student, respectively. We find empirically that specially tailored data points enable the teacher's knowledge to be demonstrated more effectively to the student. We compare our approach with existing KD methods on training popular neural architectures and demonstrate that role-wise data augmentation improves the effectiveness of KD over strong prior approaches. The code for reproducing our results can be found at https://github.com/bigaidream-projects/role-kd

Zhijian Duan, Yusen Huo, Tianyu Wang et al.

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

Yunxuan Ma, Yide Bian, Hao Xu et al.

Market equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solution concepts in economics and social optimization analysis. Existing works on market equilibrium computation primarily focus on settings with relatively few buyers. Motivated by this, our paper investigates the computation of market equilibrium in scenarios with a large-scale buyer population, where buyers and goods are represented by their contexts. Building on this realistic and generalized contextual market model, we introduce MarketFCNet, a deep learning-based method for approximating market equilibrium. We start by parameterizing the allocation of each good to each buyer using a neural network, which depends solely on the context of the buyer and the good. Next, we propose an efficient method to unbiasedly estimate the loss function of the training algorithm, enabling us to optimize the network parameters through gradient. To evaluate the approximated solution, we propose a metric called Nash Gap, which quantifies the deviation of the given allocation and price pair from the market equilibrium. Experimental results indicate that MarketFCNet delivers competitive performance and significantly lower running times compared to existing methods as the market scale expands, demonstrating the potential of deep learning-based methods to accelerate the approximation of large-scale contextual market equilibrium.

Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia et al.

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.