Andrew L. Liu

Jun He, Andrew L. Liu, Yihsu Chen

Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain environments, where a single leader interacts with a population of adaptive followers. Motivated by pressing real-world challenges such as equitable electricity tariff design for consumers with distributed energy resources (such as rooftop solar and energy storage), we formalize a class of Stackelberg Markov games and establish the existence and uniqueness of stationary Stackelberg equilibria under mild continuity and monotonicity conditions. We then extend the framework to incorporate a continuum of agents via mean-field approximation, yielding a tractable Stackelberg-Mean Field Equilibrium (S-MFE) formulation. To address the computational intractability of exact best-response dynamics, we introduce a softmax-based approximation and rigorously bound its error relative to the true Stackelberg equilibrium. Our approach enables scalable and stable learning through policy iteration without requiring full knowledge of follower objectives. We validate the framework on an energy market simulation, where a public utility or a state utility commission sets time-varying rates for a heterogeneous population of prosumers. Our results demonstrate that learned policies can simultaneously achieve economic efficiency, equity across income groups, and stability in energy systems. This work demonstrates how game-theoretic learning frameworks can support data-driven policy design in large-scale strategic environments, with applications to real-world systems like energy markets.

Jun He, Andrew L. Liu

The rapid growth of distributed energy resources (DERs), including rooftop solar and energy storage, is transforming the grid edge, where distributed technologies and customer-side systems increasingly interact with the broader power grid. DER aggregators, entities that coordinate and optimize the actions of many small-scale DERs, play a key role in this transformation. This paper presents a hybrid Mean-Field Control (MFC) and Mean-Field Game (MFG) framework for integrating DER aggregators into wholesale electricity markets. Unlike traditional approaches that treat market prices as exogenous, our model captures the feedback between aggregators' strategies and locational marginal prices (LMPs) of electricity. The MFC component optimizes DER operations within each aggregator, while the MFG models strategic interactions among multiple aggregators. To account for various uncertainties, we incorporate reinforcement learning (RL), which allows aggregators to learn optimal bidding strategies in dynamic market conditions. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a mean-field equilibrium and validate the framework through a case study of the Oahu Island power system. Results show that our approach reduces price volatility and improves market efficiency, offering a scalable and decentralized solution for DER integration in wholesale markets.

Haixiang Sun, Pengchao Tian, Zihan Zhou et al.

Learning causal structures from observational data remains a fundamental yet computationally intensive task, particularly in high-dimensional settings where existing methods face challenges such as the super-exponential growth of the search space and increasing computational demands. To address this, we introduce VISTA (Voting-based Integration of Subgraph Topologies for Acyclicity), a modular framework that decomposes the global causal structure learning problem into local subgraphs based on Markov Blankets. The global integration is achieved through a weighted voting mechanism that penalizes low-support edges via exponential decay, filters unreliable ones with an adaptive threshold, and ensures acyclicity using a Feedback Arc Set (FAS) algorithm. The framework is model-agnostic, imposing no assumptions on the inductive biases of base learners, is compatible with arbitrary data settings without requiring specific structural forms, and fully supports parallelization. We also theoretically establish finite-sample error bounds for VISTA, and prove its asymptotic consistency under mild conditions. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real datasets consistently demonstrate the effectiveness of VISTA, yielding notable improvements in both accuracy and efficiency over a wide range of base learners.

Haixiang Sun, Andrew L. Liu

Few-shot learning requires models to generalize under limited supervision while remaining robust to distribution shifts. Existing Sinkhorn Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) methods provide theoretical guarantees but rely on a fixed reference distribution, which limits their adaptability. We propose a Prototype-Guided Distributionally Robust Optimization (PG-DRO) framework that learns class-adaptive priors from abundant base data via hierarchical optimal transport and embeds them into the Sinkhorn DRO formulation. This design enables few-shot information to be organically integrated into producing class-specific robust decisions that are both theoretically grounded and efficient, and further aligns the uncertainty set with transferable structural knowledge. Experiments show that PG-DRO achieves stronger robust generalization in few-shot scenarios, outperforming both standard learners and DRO baselines.