Lioba Heimbach

Rainer Feichtinger, Florian Grötschla, Lioba Heimbach et al.

The Bitcoin Lightning Network is a layer 2 protocol designed to facilitate fast and inexpensive Bitcoin transactions. It operates by establishing channels between users, where Bitcoin is locked and transactions are conducted off-chain until the channels are closed, with only the initial and final transactions recorded on the blockchain. Routing transactions through intermediary nodes is crucial for users without direct channels, allowing these routing nodes to collect fees for their services. Nodes announce their channels to the network, forming a graph with channels as edges. In this paper, we analyze the graph structure of the Lightning Network and investigate the statistical relationships between node properties using machine learning, particularly Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). We formulate a series of tasks to explore these relationships and provide benchmarks for GNN architectures, demonstrating how topological and neighbor information enhances performance. Our evaluation of several models reveals the effectiveness of GNNs in these tasks and highlights the insights gained from their application.

Wenhao Wang, Aditya Saraf, Lioba Heimbach et al.

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer to this as spam MEV. On major rollups, it can at times consume more than half of block gas, even though only a small fraction of probes ultimately results in a trade. Despite growing awareness of this phenomenon, there is no principled framework for understanding how blockchain design parameters shape its prevalence and impact. We develop such a framework, modeling spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical evidence from Base and Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduced. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, spam is always costly: when block capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices; as block capacity grows, it increasingly consumes execution resources, raising network externality, i.e., the cost of provisioning and processing blocks. We show that spam takes an increasing share of each additional unit of block capacity, so capping it before all users are included creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eliminates disproportionate spam and externality. Second, we extend the analysis to priority fee ordering and show that ordering transactions by gas price helps reduce spam, as spammers must pay more to reach early block positions. Third, as user demand grows and blockspace is scaled accordingly, spam's share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitely.

Lioba Heimbach, Kushal Babel, Jason Milionis

Gas metering on EVM-compatible blockchains assumes that execution conditions are stable: that the resource mix is constant enough to justify collapsing execution costs into a single scalar with fixed relative prices, and that state drift between submission and execution does not materially alter a transaction's outcome. We measure the extent to which this assumption fails. We present a trace-level measurement study of EVM workloads on Ethereum (L1) and Base (L2) throughout 2025, sampling 3,000 blocks per day per chain. We decompose each transaction into opcode-level execution gas, intrinsic gas, refunds, and persistent state deltas. To measure state sensitivity, we re-execute transactions from September 2025 on older states and record how gas usage and storage access patterns change. We find the resource mix to be far from stable: on Base, storage reads and compute account for 29.2% and 24.3% of execution gas, while Ethereum devotes 34.9% to storage writes. Ethereum's gas limit doubling during 2025 shifted its own profile toward compute-heavier, Base-like patterns. Base also exhibits a higher fraction of cold storage reads (49.7% versus 39.6% on Ethereum). Persistent state growth, a permanent cost priced as a transient one, reaches 456 GB on Base versus 38 GB on Ethereum. Execution outcomes are equally unstable: gas estimates vary across nearby historical states for 46.0% of transactions on Base, compared to 13.9% on Ethereum, with especially high sensitivity for MEV and DeFi activity. Storage access patterns also diverge across states, limiting the effectiveness of access lists and complicating parallel execution. Our work provides an empirical foundation for multi-dimensional gas metering and explicit pricing of state growth. They show that state-sensitive execution behavior complicates workload estimation, directly affecting transaction predictability and user experience.

Orestis Alpos, Lioba Heimbach, Kartik Nayak et al.

Auctions are now central to blockchain markets, settling NFT sales, token launches, DeFi liquidations, and arbitrage opportunities. Each on-chain bid is a public transaction whose inclusion is decided by a single consensus proposer per block. The proposer can observe pending bids, exclude competitors, and submit bids of their own, breaking the fairness guarantees of classical sealed-bid auctions. To enable latency-sensitive sealed-bid auctions in blockchain settings, we formalize four properties -- each necessary to prevent a concrete attack -- and design a protocol achieving all four: hiding bid contents, existence, and bidder identity until reveal (Hiding); counting all timely honest bids and rejecting late adversarial bids (Simultaneous Release); preventing silent withdrawal of committed bids (No Free Bid Withdrawal); and charging on-chain fees only to winners (Auction Participation Efficiency). Our protocol uses a timestamping oracle (instantiated with a committee of 2f_ts+1 timestampers) and a censorship-resistant inclusion predicate (instantiated using a FOCIL-based inclusion list), with only the winning bid settled on-chain. Our construction relies on two zero-knowledge proofs: an eligibility proof that anonymously proves deposit membership to the timestamping committee, and an auction proof that binds a bid to a specific auction for the inclusion list committee. We implement both using Groth16 over BN254 with Poseidon hashing in arkworks/Rust: the auction proof generates in 13 ms and verifies in under 1 ms; eligibility proofs for Merkle trees up to 2^32 bidders generate in 47-159 ms and verify in about 1 ms. Together, this yields a sealed-bid auction primitive practical for high-value, time-sensitive blockchain settings.

Lioba Heimbach, Roger Wattenhofer

Predatory trading bots lurking in Ethereum's mempool present invisible taxation of traders on automated market makers (AMMs). AMM traders specify a slippage tolerance to indicate the maximum price movement they are willing to accept. This way, traders avoid automatic transaction failure in case of small price movements before their trade request executes. However, while a too-small slippage tolerance may lead to trade failures, a too-large slippage tolerance allows predatory trading bots to profit from sandwich attacks. These bots can extract the difference between the slippage tolerance and the actual price movement as profit. In this work, we introduce the sandwich game to analyze sandwich attacks analytically from both the attacker and victim perspectives. Moreover, we provide a simple and highly effective algorithm that traders can use to set the slippage tolerance. We unveil that most broadcasted transactions can avoid sandwich attacks while simultaneously only experiencing a low risk of transaction failure. Thereby, we demonstrate that a constant auto-slippage cannot adjust to varying trade sizes and pool characteristics. Our algorithm outperforms the constant auto-slippage suggested by the biggest AMM, Uniswap, in all performed tests. Specifically, our algorithm repeatedly demonstrates a cost reduction exceeding a factor of 100.