Zach Studdiford

Zach Studdiford, Gary Lupyan

When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models. We evaluate human participants and 25 LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations and observe similar patterns of errors in both people and models. We then identify the set of attention heads driving LLM responses and find that these heads implement a form of pattern-matching. These attention heads allow us to predict seemingly inexplicable reasoning errors in people caused by ostensibly irrelevant prompt details. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs is more consistent with a form of pattern-matching than with abstract world models.

Zach Studdiford, Timothy T. Rogers, Siddharth Suresh et al.

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) steering techniques focus on task-specific performance, overlooking how well steered representations align with human cognition. Using a well-established triadic similarity judgment task, we assessed steered LLMs on their ability to flexibly judge similarity between concepts based on size or kind. We found that prompt-based steering methods outperformed other methods both in terms of steering accuracy and model-to-human alignment. We also found LLMs were biased towards 'kind' similarity and struggled with 'size' alignment. This evaluation approach, grounded in human cognition, adds further support to the efficacy of prompt-based steering and reveals privileged representational axes in LLMs prior to steering.

Zach Studdiford, Timothy T. Rogers, Kushin Mukherjee et al.

The ability to translate diverse patterns of inputs into structured patterns of behavior has been thought to rest on both humans' and machines' ability to learn robust representations of relevant concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has led to a diversity of computational ingredients -- architectures, fine tuning methods, and training datasets among others -- but it remains unclear which of these ingredients are most crucial for building models that develop human-like representations. Further, most current LLM benchmarks are not suited to measuring representational alignment between humans and models, making benchmark scores unreliable for assessing if current LLMs are making progress towards becoming useful cognitive models. We address these limitations by first evaluating a set of over 70 models that widely vary in their computational ingredients on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in the cognitive sciences for measuring human conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. Comparing human and model representations, we find that models that undergo instruction-finetuning and which have larger dimensionality of attention heads are among the most human aligned, while multimodal pretraining and parameter size have limited bearing on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and scores on existing benchmarks reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., MMLU) are better suited than others (e.g., MUSR) for capturing representational alignment, no existing benchmark is capable of fully accounting for the variance of alignment scores, demonstrating their insufficiency in capturing human-AI alignment. Taken together, our findings help highlight the computational ingredients most essential for advancing LLMs towards models of human conceptual representation and address a key benchmarking gap in LLM evaluation.

Yun-Shiuan Chuang, Krirk Nirunwiroj, Zach Studdiford et al.

Creating human-like large language model (LLM) agents is crucial for faithful social simulation. Having LLMs role-play based on demographic information sometimes improves human likeness but often does not. This study assessed whether LLM alignment with human behavior can be improved by integrating information from empirically-derived human belief networks. Using data from a human survey, we estimated a belief network encompassing 64 topics loading on nine non-overlapping latent factors. We then seeded LLM-based agents with an opinion on one topic, and assessed the alignment of its expressed opinions on remaining test topics with corresponding human data. Role-playing based on demographic information alone did not align LLM and human opinions, but seeding the agent with a single belief greatly improved alignment for topics related in the belief network, and not for topics outside the network. These results suggest a novel path for human-LLM belief alignment in work seeking to simulate and understand patterns of belief distributions in society.