Chen Chen

Chen Chen, Xinlong Hao, Weiwen Liu et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in decision-making and reasoning, particularly when integrated with various tools to effectively solve complex problems. However, existing benchmarks for evaluating LLMs' tool usage face several limitations: (1) limited evaluation scenarios, often lacking assessments in real multi-turn dialogue contexts; (2) narrow evaluation dimensions, with insufficient detailed assessments of how LLMs use tools; and (3) reliance on LLMs or real API executions for evaluation, which introduces significant overhead. To address these challenges, we introduce ACEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing tool usage in LLMs. ACEBench categorizes data into three primary types based on evaluation methodology: Normal, Special, and Agent. "Normal" evaluates tool usage in basic scenarios; "Special" evaluates tool usage in situations with ambiguous or incomplete instructions; "Agent" evaluates tool usage through multi-agent interactions to simulate real-world, multi-turn dialogues. We conducted extensive experiments using ACEBench, analyzing various LLMs in-depth and providing a more granular examination of error causes across different data types.

Chen Chen, Yuchen Sun, Jiaxin Gao et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have seen significant advancements, achieving superior performance in various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. However, they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where models behave normally for standard queries but generate harmful responses or unintended output when specific triggers are activated. Existing backdoor defenses either lack comprehensiveness, focusing on narrow trigger settings, detection-only mechanisms, and limited domains, or fail to withstand advanced scenarios like model-editing-based, multi-trigger, and triggerless attacks. In this paper, we present LETHE, a novel method to eliminate backdoor behaviors from LLMs through knowledge dilution using both internal and external mechanisms. Internally, LETHE leverages a lightweight dataset to train a clean model, which is then merged with the backdoored model to neutralize malicious behaviors by diluting the backdoor impact within the model's parametric memory. Externally, LETHE incorporates benign and semantically relevant evidence into the prompt to distract LLM's attention from backdoor features. Experimental results on classification and generation domains across 5 widely used LLMs demonstrate that LETHE outperforms 8 state-of-the-art defense baselines against 8 backdoor attacks. LETHE reduces the attack success rate of advanced backdoor attacks by up to 98% while maintaining model utility. Furthermore, LETHE has proven to be cost-efficient and robust against adaptive backdoor attacks.