Qinlin He

Qinlin He, Chunlei Peng, Decheng Liu et al.

DeepFake detection is pivotal in personal privacy and public safety. With the iterative advancement of DeepFake techniques, high-quality forged videos and images are becoming increasingly deceptive. Prior research has seen numerous attempts by scholars to incorporate biometric features into the field of DeepFake detection. However, traditional biometric-based approaches tend to segregate biometric features from general ones and freeze the biometric feature extractor. These approaches resulted in the exclusion of valuable general features, potentially leading to a performance decline and, consequently, a failure to fully exploit the potential of biometric information in assisting DeepFake detection. Moreover, insufficient attention has been dedicated to scrutinizing gaze authenticity within the realm of DeepFake detection in recent years. In this paper, we introduce GazeForensics, an innovative DeepFake detection method that utilizes gaze representation obtained from a 3D gaze estimation model to regularize the corresponding representation within our DeepFake detection model, while concurrently integrating general features to further enhance the performance of our model. Experiment results reveal that our proposed GazeForensics outperforms the current state-of-the-art methods.

Qinlin He, Zeming Zhuang, Yongji Wu et al.

Physical adversarial attacks on vision systems are typically studied through scene manipulation, such as adversarial patches or projections, where the adversary controls what the camera observes. Camera-side attacks using stickers or auxiliary optics have also been explored, but they treat attacks as image-space perturbations from designed patterns. This misses how physical imperfections interact with scene-dependent lighting and optics. We identify a threat: passive lens-side damage that is persistent yet trigger-conditioned, producing optical artifacts that bias geometric inference under particular visual conditions. We instantiate this threat through Scratch-induced Lens Adversarial Streak Hijacking SLASH, a physical-world attack caused by small scratches on a camera lens or protective cover. Scratches interact with bright light sources and specular reflections to create structured streak artifacts that distort depth cues. Since the perturbation is fixed in the optical path but triggered by the scene, it is both persistent and selective. We formulate the attack in optical space, model the scratch pattern as a trigger-conditioned optical channel, and optimize one fixed configuration across diverse viewing conditions. We evaluate SLASH on monocular depth estimation and monocular 3D object detection in digital and real-world settings. Under the fixed-scratch constraint, directional depth shifts reach up to 32% relative error for monocular depth estimation, with consistent effects on monocular 3D object detection. Physical experiments confirm transfer to real camera recordings, inducing depth shifts above the model's natural prediction baseline. These findings reveal an attack surface where benign-looking hardware imperfections act as latent, scene-triggered adversarial mechanisms, challenging assumptions about physical robustness and motivating defenses for secure vision systems.