Shaofeng Li

Ke Li, Fuyu Dong, Di Wang et al.

Remote sensing change detection aims to perceive changes occurring on the Earth's surface from remote sensing data in different periods, and feed these changes back to humans. However, most existing methods only focus on detecting change regions, lacking the capability to interact with users to identify changes that the users expect. In this paper, we introduce a new task named Change Detection Question Answering and Grounding (CDQAG), which extends the traditional change detection task by providing interpretable textual answers and intuitive visual evidence. To this end, we construct the first CDQAG benchmark dataset, termed QAG-360K, comprising over 360K triplets of questions, textual answers, and corresponding high-quality visual masks. It encompasses 10 essential land-cover categories and 8 comprehensive question types, which provides a valuable and diverse dataset for remote sensing applications. Furthermore, we present VisTA, a simple yet effective baseline method that unifies the tasks of question answering and grounding by delivering both visual and textual answers. Our method achieves state-of-the-art results on both the classic change detection-based visual question answering (CDVQA) and the proposed CDQAG datasets. Extensive qualitative and quantitative experimental results provide useful insights for developing better CDQAG models, and we hope that our work can inspire further research in this important yet underexplored research field. The proposed benchmark dataset and method are available at https://github.com/like413/VisTA.

Han Yang, Shaofeng Li, Tian Dong et al.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), as valuable intellectual property, face unauthorized use. Existing protections, such as digital watermarking, are largely passive; they provide only post-hoc ownership verification and cannot actively prevent the illicit use of a stolen model. This work proposes a proactive protection scheme, dubbed ``Authority Backdoor," which embeds access constraints directly into the model. In particular, the scheme utilizes a backdoor learning framework to intrinsically lock a model's utility, such that it performs normally only in the presence of a specific trigger (e.g., a hardware fingerprint). But in its absence, the DNN's performance degrades to be useless. To further enhance the security of the proposed authority scheme, the certifiable robustness is integrated to prevent an adaptive attacker from removing the implanted backdoor. The resulting framework establishes a secure authority mechanism for DNNs, combining access control with certifiable robustness against adversarial attacks. Extensive experiments on diverse architectures and datasets validate the effectiveness and certifiable robustness of the proposed framework.

Ruoxi Sun, Minhui Xue, Gareth Tyson et al.

Numerous open-source and commercial malware detectors are available. However, their efficacy is threatened by new adversarial attacks, whereby malware attempts to evade detection, e.g., by performing feature-space manipulation. In this work, we propose an explainability-guided and model-agnostic testing framework for robustness of malware detectors when confronted with adversarial attacks. The framework introduces the concept of Accrued Malicious Magnitude (AMM) to identify which malware features could be manipulated to maximize the likelihood of evading detection. We then use this framework to test several state-of-the-art malware detectors' abilities to detect manipulated malware. We find that (i) commercial antivirus engines are vulnerable to AMM-guided test cases; (ii) the ability of a manipulated malware generated using one detector to evade detection by another detector (i.e., transferability) depends on the overlap of features with large AMM values between the different detectors; and (iii) AMM values effectively measure the fragility of features (i.e., capability of feature-space manipulation to flip the prediction results) and explain the robustness of malware detectors facing evasion attacks. Our findings shed light on the limitations of current malware detectors, as well as how they can be improved.

Yihe Fan, Yuxin Cao, Ziyu Zhao et al.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities that increasingly influence various aspects of our daily lives, constantly defining the new boundary of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Image modalities, enriched with profound semantic information and a more continuous mathematical nature compared to other modalities, greatly enhance the functionalities of MLLMs when integrated. However, this integration serves as a double-edged sword, providing attackers with expansive vulnerabilities to exploit for highly covert and harmful attacks. The pursuit of reliable AI systems like powerful MLLMs has emerged as a pivotal area of contemporary research. In this paper, we endeavor to demostrate the multifaceted risks associated with the incorporation of image modalities into MLLMs. Initially, we delineate the foundational components and training processes of MLLMs. Subsequently, we construct a threat model, outlining the security vulnerabilities intrinsic to MLLMs. Moreover, we analyze and summarize existing scholarly discourses on MLLMs' attack and defense mechanisms, culminating in suggestions for the future research on MLLM security. Through this comprehensive analysis, we aim to deepen the academic understanding of MLLM security challenges and propel forward the development of trustworthy MLLM systems.

Ke Li, Di Wang, Zhangyuan Hu et al.

Infrared-visible object detection (IVOD) seeks to harness the complementary information in infrared and visible images, thereby enhancing the performance of detectors in complex environments. However, existing methods often neglect the frequency characteristics of complementary information, such as the abundant high-frequency details in visible images and the valuable low-frequency thermal information in infrared images, thus constraining detection performance. To solve this problem, we introduce a novel Frequency-Driven Feature Decomposition Network for IVOD, called FD2-Net, which effectively captures the unique frequency representations of complementary information across multimodal visual spaces. Specifically, we propose a feature decomposition encoder, wherein the high-frequency unit (HFU) utilizes discrete cosine transform to capture representative high-frequency features, while the low-frequency unit (LFU) employs dynamic receptive fields to model the multi-scale context of diverse objects. Next, we adopt a parameter-free complementary strengths strategy to enhance multimodal features through seamless inter-frequency recoupling. Furthermore, we innovatively design a multimodal reconstruction mechanism that recovers image details lost during feature extraction, further leveraging the complementary information from infrared and visible images to enhance overall representational capacity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FD2-Net outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) models across various IVOD benchmarks, i.e. LLVIP (96.2% mAP), FLIR (82.9% mAP), and M3FD (83.5% mAP).

Tian Dong, Yan Meng, Shaofeng Li et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into daily routines, yet they raise significant privacy and safety concerns. Recent research proposes collaborative inference, which outsources the early-layer inference to ensure data locality, and introduces model safety auditing based on inner neuron patterns. Both techniques expose the LLM's Internal States (ISs), which are traditionally considered irreversible to inputs due to optimization challenges and the highly abstract representations in deep layers. In this work, we challenge this assumption by proposing four inversion attacks that significantly improve the semantic similarity and token matching rate of inverted inputs. Specifically, we first develop two white-box optimization-based attacks tailored for low-depth and high-depth ISs. These attacks avoid local minima convergence, a limitation observed in prior work, through a two-phase inversion process. Then, we extend our optimization attack under more practical black-box weight access by leveraging the transferability between the source and the derived LLMs. Additionally, we introduce a generation-based attack that treats inversion as a translation task, employing an inversion model to reconstruct inputs. Extensive evaluation of short and long prompts from medical consulting and coding assistance datasets and 6 LLMs validates the effectiveness of our inversion attacks. Notably, a 4,112-token long medical consulting prompt can be nearly perfectly inverted with 86.88 F1 token matching from the middle layer of Llama-3 model. Finally, we evaluate four practical defenses that we found cannot perfectly prevent ISs inversion and draw conclusions for future mitigation design.

Yunmeng Shu, Shaofeng Li, Tian Dong et al.

Personalized Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly prevalent, showcasing the impressive capabilities of models like GPT-4. This trend has also catalyzed extensive research on deploying LLMs on mobile devices. Feasible approaches for such edge-cloud deployment include using split learning. However, previous research has largely overlooked the privacy leakage associated with intermediate representations transmitted from devices to servers. This work is the first to identify model inversion attacks in the split learning framework for LLMs, emphasizing the necessity of secure defense. For the first time, we introduce mutual information entropy to understand the information propagation of Transformer-based LLMs and assess privacy attack performance for LLM blocks. To address the issue of representations being sparser and containing less information than embeddings, we propose a two-stage attack system in which the first part projects representations into the embedding space, and the second part uses a generative model to recover text from these embeddings. This design breaks down the complexity and achieves attack scores of 38%-75% in various scenarios, with an over 60% improvement over the SOTA. This work comprehensively highlights the potential privacy risks during the deployment of personalized LLMs on the edge side.

Zirui Peng, Shaofeng Li, Guoxing Chen et al.

In this paper, we propose a novel and practical mechanism which enables the service provider to verify whether a suspect model is stolen from the victim model via model extraction attacks. Our key insight is that the profile of a DNN model's decision boundary can be uniquely characterized by its Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). UAPs belong to a low-dimensional subspace and piracy models' subspaces are more consistent with victim model's subspace compared with non-piracy model. Based on this, we propose a UAP fingerprinting method for DNN models and train an encoder via contrastive learning that takes fingerprint as inputs, outputs a similarity score. Extensive studies show that our framework can detect model IP breaches with confidence > 99.99 within only 20 fingerprints of the suspect model. It has good generalizability across different model architectures and is robust against post-modifications on stolen models.

Shaofeng Li, Hui Liu, Tian Dong et al.

Natural language processing (NLP) systems have been proven to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, whereby hidden features (backdoors) are trained into a language model and may only be activated by specific inputs (called triggers), to trick the model into producing unexpected behaviors. In this paper, we create covert and natural triggers for textual backdoor attacks, \textit{hidden backdoors}, where triggers can fool both modern language models and human inspection. We deploy our hidden backdoors through two state-of-the-art trigger embedding methods. The first approach via homograph replacement, embeds the trigger into deep neural networks through the visual spoofing of lookalike character replacement. The second approach uses subtle differences between text generated by language models and real natural text to produce trigger sentences with correct grammar and high fluency. We demonstrate that the proposed hidden backdoors can be effective across three downstream security-critical NLP tasks, representative of modern human-centric NLP systems, including toxic comment detection, neural machine translation (NMT), and question answering (QA). Our two hidden backdoor attacks can achieve an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of at least $97\%$ with an injection rate of only $3\%$ in toxic comment detection, $95.1\%$ ASR in NMT with less than $0.5\%$ injected data, and finally $91.12\%$ ASR against QA updated with only 27 poisoning data samples on a model previously trained with 92,024 samples (0.029\%). We are able to demonstrate the adversary's high success rate of attacks, while maintaining functionality for regular users, with triggers inconspicuous by the human administrators.

Shaofeng Li, Shiqing Ma, Minhui Xue et al.

Intuitively, a backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is to inject hidden malicious behaviors into DNNs such that the backdoor model behaves legitimately for benign inputs, yet invokes a predefined malicious behavior when its input contains a malicious trigger. The trigger can take a plethora of forms, including a special object present in the image (e.g., a yellow pad), a shape filled with custom textures (e.g., logos with particular colors) or even image-wide stylizations with special filters (e.g., images altered by Nashville or Gotham filters). These filters can be applied to the original image by replacing or perturbing a set of image pixels.

Shaofeng Li, Minhui Xue, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been proven vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden features (patterns) trained to a normal model, which is only activated by some specific input (called triggers), trick the model into producing unexpected behavior. In this paper, we create covert and scattered triggers for backdoor attacks, invisible backdoors, where triggers can fool both DNN models and human inspection. We apply our invisible backdoors through two state-of-the-art methods of embedding triggers for backdoor attacks. The first approach on Badnets embeds the trigger into DNNs through steganography. The second approach of a trojan attack uses two types of additional regularization terms to generate the triggers with irregular shape and size. We use the Attack Success Rate and Functionality to measure the performance of our attacks. We introduce two novel definitions of invisibility for human perception; one is conceptualized by the Perceptual Adversarial Similarity Score (PASS) and the other is Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS). We show that the proposed invisible backdoors can be fairly effective across various DNN models as well as four datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and GTSRB, by measuring their attack success rates for the adversary, functionality for the normal users, and invisibility scores for the administrators. We finally argue that the proposed invisible backdoor attacks can effectively thwart the state-of-the-art trojan backdoor detection approaches, such as Neural Cleanse and TABOR.