Jason Zhang

Qiyang Li, Jason Zhang, Dibya Ghosh et al. · berkeley

Learning to solve tasks from a sparse reward signal is a major challenge for standard reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. However, in the real world, agents rarely need to solve sparse reward tasks entirely from scratch. More often, we might possess prior experience to draw on that provides considerable guidance about which actions and outcomes are possible in the world, which we can use to explore more effectively for new tasks. In this work, we study how prior data without reward labels may be used to guide and accelerate exploration for an agent solving a new sparse reward task. We propose a simple approach that learns a reward model from online experience, labels the unlabeled prior data with optimistic rewards, and then uses it concurrently alongside the online data for downstream policy and critic optimization. This general formula leads to rapid exploration in several challenging sparse-reward domains where tabula rasa exploration is insufficient, including the AntMaze domain, Adroit hand manipulation domain, and a visual simulated robotic manipulation domain. Our results highlight the ease of incorporating unlabeled prior data into existing online RL algorithms, and the (perhaps surprising) effectiveness of doing so.

Tom Gibbs, Ethan Kosak-Hine, George Ingebretsen et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. However, these models are still susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which are becoming increasingly dangerous as models become increasingly powerful. In this work, we introduce a dataset of jailbreaks where each example can be input in both a single or a multi-turn format. We show that while equivalent in content, they are not equivalent in jailbreak success: defending against one structure does not guarantee defense against the other. Similarly, LLM-based filter guardrails also perform differently depending on not just the input content but the input structure. Thus, vulnerabilities of frontier models should be studied in both single and multi-turn settings; this dataset provides a tool to do so.

Ze Chen, Kangxu Wang, Zijian Cai et al.

This paper mainly describes the dma submission to the TempoWiC task, which achieves a macro-F1 score of 77.05% and attains the first place in this task. We first explore the impact of different pre-trained language models. Then we adopt data cleaning, data augmentation, and adversarial training strategies to enhance the model generalization and robustness. For further improvement, we integrate POS information and word semantic representation using a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) approach. The experimental results show that MoE can overcome the feature overuse issue and combine the context, POS, and word semantic features well. Additionally, we use a model ensemble method for the final prediction, which has been proven effective by many research works.

Julius Broomfield, Tom Gibbs, Ethan Kosak-Hine et al.

LLM jailbreaks are a widespread safety challenge. Given this problem has not yet been tractable, we suggest targeting a key failure mechanism: the failure of safety to generalize across semantically equivalent inputs. We further focus the target by requiring desirable tractability properties of attacks to study: explainability, transferability between models, and transferability between goals. We perform red-teaming within this framework by uncovering new vulnerabilities to multi-turn, multi-image, and translation-based attacks. These attacks are semantically equivalent by our design to their single-turn, single-image, or untranslated counterparts, enabling systematic comparisons; we show that the different structures yield different safety outcomes. We then demonstrate the potential for this framework to enable new defenses by proposing a Structure Rewriting Guardrail, which converts an input to a structure more conducive to safety assessment. This guardrail significantly improves refusal of harmful inputs, without over-refusing benign ones. Thus, by framing this intermediate challenge - more tractable than universal defenses but essential for long-term safety - we highlight a critical milestone for AI safety research.