7.2DSApr 30
The Impact of Approximation on Algorithmic ProgressJeffery Li, Jayson Lynch, Liva Olina et al.
In nearly every discipline, scientific computations are limited by the cost and speed of computation. For example, the best-known exact algorithms for the canonical Traveling Salesman Problem would take centuries to run on an instance of size 1 million. A natural response to such limits is to try to find new algorithms or to parallelize existing ones, but many algorithms are already at their theoretically-optimal level and parallelization is often impossible or prohibitively expensive. Starting in the 1960's, computer scientists pursued another solution: allowing solutions to have a small amount of error (i.e. approximating them). In this paper, we survey 118 of the most important algorithm problems in computer science, quantifying the gains and tradeoffs from approximation that have been discovered over the history of the field. Overall, only $\approx$20\% of problems have benefited from approximation. However, those with good approximate algorithms can be dramatically faster to compute with little cost to accuracy. For example, a quarter of computationally intractable problems (e.g. those that take exponential time to compute) have polynomial time approximate algorithms. Approximation also increases the number of algorithms that can run in linear time by 23\%, opening up new computational opportunities for those working in the big data regime. This work also sheds light on what should be expected from progress in AI, where approximation is at the heart of how deep learning works.
14.0AIJul 1
Two AI Metrics Diverged: Will it Make All the Difference?Alex Fogelson, Zachary A. Brown, Hans Gundlach et al.
As exponential compute scaling continues, will the capabilities of frontier AI models outstrip what is accessible to developers on a small fixed budget? Or will capabilities converge, with "meek models inheriting the earth"? Building on Gundlach et al. (2025b), we show that the answer depends on how we value and measure AI capabilities. We discuss conventional performance measures and show that, while validation loss shows a shrinking gap, on other metrics frontier models grow their lead forever. Classifying performance metrics by their functional forms in relation to training (and inference) compute, we provide tight mathematical conditions for determining which metrics favor meek models, and show that bounded performance metrics always do. But careful interpretation of performance metrics is essential: we show that many common bounded metrics have closely-related counterpart metrics that are unbounded (and vice versa). Determining the apt metric in a domain is a prerequisite for policy, since bounded and unbounded metrics may suggest opposing policy responses. If a particular capability -- like software engineering, synthetic biology, or rhetorical persuasiveness -- is unbounded when measured in the terms we care about, frontier-level capability will likely be concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy actors. Conversely, if that capability is instead bounded, frontier-level capabilities proliferate through meek models into the hands of the many.