Taylor Webb

2papers

2 Papers

3.4CVJun 16
Attention Alignment Between Humans and Vision-Language Models

Isaac R. Christian, Udith Haputhanthrige, Hanna Hornfeld et al.

Visual perception depends on top-down goals and bottom-up sensory mechanisms. Vision-language models implement both, allowing us to treat each component as a separable hypothesis about what drives where we look. We compared spatial attention maps from six vision-language models against human fixation heatmaps recorded on 200 images during two tasks (general description and social captioning). The six models spanned a 2$\times$2 factorial of CNN vs.\ ViT encoders crossed with LSTM vs.\ Transformer decoders, plus Molmo 7B-D and Qwen3.5 9B. We found that both decoder and encoder architecture shaped alignment, but decoder choice dominated. LSTM vs.\ Transformer decoders increased alignment by 40--50 percentage points (80--87\% vs.\ 40--59\% of the human noise ceiling). In contrast, CNN vs.\ ViT encoders contributed a secondary 5--20 point advantage depending on decoder family, with CNN-LSTM the most aligned model overall (85--87\%). Despite their alignment advantage, LSTM-decoder attention maps were spatially diffuse and minimally task-differentiated; ViT-Transformer, the weakest in alignment, showed the sharpest spatial concentration and strongest task differentiation. A hemispatial-neglect simulation confirmed that ablating attention impacted LSTM decoders more than Transformer decoders. In an exploratory extension using TRIBE-simulated synthetic neural responses, fixation alignment and neural relevance dissociate: CNN-Transformer attention maps better predicted synthetic brain activity despite lower fixation alignment, with attention maps best predicting early visual cortex. Together, top-down and bottom-up components trade off what they predict in behavioral and synthetic neural data.

3.3AIJun 25, 2025
Engineering Sentience

Konstantin Demin, Taylor Webb, Eric Elmoznino et al.

We spell out a definition of sentience that may be useful for designing and building it in machines. We propose that for sentience to be meaningful for AI, it must be fleshed out in functional, computational terms, in enough detail to allow for implementation. Yet, this notion of sentience must also reflect something essentially 'subjective', beyond just having the general capacity to encode perceptual content. For this specific functional notion of sentience to occur, we propose that certain sensory signals need to be both assertoric (persistent) and qualitative. To illustrate the definition in more concrete terms, we sketch out some ways for potential implementation, given current technology. Understanding what it takes for artificial agents to be functionally sentient can also help us avoid creating them inadvertently, or at least, realize that we have created them in a timely manner.