Edmund Lau

Xander Davies, Giorgi Giglemiani, Edmund Lau et al.

Frontier LLMs are safeguarded against attempts to extract harmful information via adversarial prompts known as "jailbreaks". Recently, defenders have developed classifier-based systems that have survived thousands of hours of human red teaming. We introduce Boundary Point Jailbreaking (BPJ), a new class of automated jailbreak attacks that evade the strongest industry-deployed safeguards. Unlike previous attacks that rely on white/grey-box assumptions (such as classifier scores or gradients) or libraries of existing jailbreaks, BPJ is fully black-box and uses only a single bit of information per query: whether or not the classifier flags the interaction. To achieve this, BPJ addresses the core difficulty in optimising attacks against robust real-world defences: evaluating whether a proposed modification to an attack is an improvement. Instead of directly trying to learn an attack for a target harmful string, BPJ converts the string into a curriculum of intermediate attack targets and then actively selects evaluation points that best detect small changes in attack strength ("boundary points"). We believe BPJ is the first fully automated attack algorithm that succeeds in developing universal jailbreaks against Constitutional Classifiers, as well as the first automated attack algorithm that succeeds against GPT-5's input classifier without relying on human attack seeds. BPJ is difficult to defend against in individual interactions but incurs many flags during optimisation, suggesting that effective defence requires supplementing single-interaction methods with batch-level monitoring.

Yingjie Wang, Yi Dong, Edmund Lau et al.

Rare events govern the safety profile of modern AI systems, yet their probabilities are extremely difficult to estimate: direct Monte Carlo requires prohibitive sample budgets. Subset Simulation (SS) addresses this by decomposing a rare-event probability into moderate conditional probabilities over nested intermediate events. However, classical SS requires a handcrafted scalar performance function whose sublevel sets define those events, demanding detailed knowledge of the failure geometry and limiting transfer to new domains. We propose SCARCE (Scalable Cascade Analysis for Rare-event Characterisation via Embeddings), which replaces the performance function with learned latent representations and geometric rulers that score proximity to failure regions. Adaptive thresholding constructs nested intermediate events directly from data. We formalise SCARCE through a non-negative supermartingale, yielding a high-probability upper envelope that remains valid under early stopping. On MNIST misclassification, where dense Monte Carlo provides ground truth, SCARCE achieves approximately 400--500 times lower mean absolute error than grid-searched traditional SS while eliminating systematic over-counting. We then study PAIR-style LLM jailbreaks under a fleet-level threat model with adversarial fraction $η$. On Llama-Guard-3-8B hidden states, a PCA-based ruler attains 2.6% mean relative error for $η\geq 10^{-3}$ against finite-sample references whose average bootstrap relative half-width is 27.9%, and transfers to a GCG-style corpus with 2.93% relative error after recalibration. A directional criterion $\mathrm{KL}(p_{\mathrm{good}}\,\|\,p_{\mathrm{bad}})$ ranks rulers consistently with estimation error (Spearman $ρ=0.83$).