Qinqin He

Yunhao Feng, Ruixiao Lin, Ming Wen et al.

LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks. However, existing safety testing targets expert-designed safety violations, and the corresponding outcomes are evaluated by hard-coded rules, making them costly to extend as agents evolve. To this end, we present Vera, an end-to-end automated safety testing framework that instantiates software engineering testing principles for non-deterministic agents through a three-stage, self-reinforcing pipeline. First, a literature-driven exploration continuously discovers and structures emerging risks into taxonomies of safety risks, attack methods, and tool execution environments. Second, combinatorial composition across taxonomy dimensions produces executable safety cases, each specifying a concrete safety goal, a programmatically constructed initial state, and a deterministic verification predicate grounded in observable artifacts. Third, adaptive execution runs heterogeneous agents in isolated sandboxes where a control agent steers multi-turn interaction based on runtime observations, while evidence-grounded verifiers judge outcomes from environment state and tool-call evidence rather than model self-report. We evaluate Vera on four production agent frameworks (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Claude Code), revealing substantial safety weaknesses, with average attack success rates reaching 93.9\% under multi-channel attacks; we also release Vera-Bench, comprising 1600 executable safety cases spanning 124 risk categories across three execution settings. These results indicate that modular, executable testing infrastructure is essential for rigorous and maintainable safety evaluation of rapidly evolving agentic systems at scale. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/Vera.

Yuanmin Huang, Zhenfei Zhang, Mi Zhang et al.

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization. This leaves a blind spot for visual synonym attacks (VSA), a jailbreak where benign-looking prompts elicit prohibited imagery through implicit visual associations. As a result, current defenses face a safety-utility dilemma: they may either under-mitigate VSA threats or over-suppress visually similar benign concepts. The core challenge is that VSA hides the unsafe target at the textual surface while revealing it through generation-time visual-semantic convergence. In this work, we therefore shift from static suppression of pre-specified unsafe concepts to dynamic tracing of how unsafe semantics emerge during generation. Our mechanistic analysis shows that VSA and explicit unsafe prompts converge through sparse semantic-injecting attention heads, which serve as inference-time bottlenecks for prohibited visual semantics. Based on this insight, we propose AEGIS (Adaptive Evasion Guard via Identification and Steering), an inference-time defense that applies similarity-aware repulsion only at the identified vulnerable heads. Evaluated against 16 baselines, AEGIS improves both safety and utility. On SD 1.4, it reduces ASR to $\mathbf{0.00}/\mathbf{0.03}$ for in-domain violence/nudity VSA and achieves ASRs $\le \mathbf{0.09}$ on out-of-domain explicit and adversarial attacks. It preserves benign fidelity, avoids suppressing hard-negative concepts, and transfers to SD 2.1 and FLUX.1 after re-identifying the critical heads for each backbone.