Yiguang Hong

2papers

2 Papers

5.4ROJul 18
SAGE: A Socially-Aware Generative Engine for Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Navigation

Lan Hu, Minghui Liwang, Wenbo Zhu et al.

Safe and socially compliant navigation in open human-robot environments requires robots to reason about heterogeneous participants with different dynamics, autonomy levels, and social roles. Existing trajectory prediction and planning methods often rely on homogeneous interaction assumptions or enforce only geometric collision constraints, making it difficult to jointly model asymmetric interactions, coupled prediction-planning, and soft social norms. This paper proposes SAGE, a socially-aware generative engine for heterogeneous multi-agent navigation. SAGE represents robots and surrounding entities as a directed heterogeneous graph and employs a Heterogeneous Graph Transformer (HGT) to encode type-specific asymmetric interactions. Conditioned on the resulting context, a diffusion-based generative module jointly models future entity trajectories and robot trajectory plans. During inference, a training-free safety-social energy guidance mechanism refines sampled robot trajectories using differentiable collision, kinematic, task-progress, and role-conditioned social-compliance terms. Extensive experiments on real-world (ETH/UCY and SDD) and synthetic datasets verify the effectiveness of SAGE in improving safety and social compliance while maintaining task performance. The proposed guidance mechanism consistently reduces collision and social-violation rates, scales to teams of up to 20 robots, and enables explicit control of the safety-accuracy-task trade-off without retraining. These findings demonstrate the potential of SAGE as a scalable framework for socially-aware multi-agent navigation in complex environments.

6.2GTJul 19
Equilibrium analysis of three-player General Lotto game with leader-follower framework

Yang Jiao, Dunbiao Niu, Yiguang Hong

In this paper, we introduce the General Lotto game with a regulator (R-Lotto), a leader-follower extension of the classical two-player General Lotto game. The model captures regulatory interventions in competitive resource allocation, where a regulator first chooses an intervention parameter to influence the subsequent competition between two resource-constrained followers. The intervention parameter represents favoritism toward one of the followers, and the followers then play a general Lotto subgame with favoritism. We derive the followers' equilibrium payoff and characterize the Nash--Stackelberg equilibrium (NSE) intervention of the regulator. We further develop a multi-battlefield R-Lotto model with a regulator budget constraint. In this setting, the follower subgames on different battlefield is decoupled, while the regulator's intervention decisions are coupled through a common budget. Numerical simulations demonstrate the proposed equilibrium characterizations and provide practical decision-making guidance for the regulator.