David Lo

Shamse Tasnim Cynthia, Ratnadira Widyasari, Banani Roy et al.

Code review is a critical quality assurance practice in software engineering development, and AI coding agents are increasingly generating review comments on pull requests. However, little is known about how developers actually respond to such agent-generated feedback. In this paper, we present the first large-scale empirical study on the resolution of agent-generated code review comments. We analyze $54{,}791$ comments generated by five widely used coding agents (i.e., Copilot, Cursor, Codex, Devin, and Claude) across $342$ Python repositories on GitHub. We examine (1) resolution rates across agents and comment types, (2) the role of developer experience, and (3) characteristics that influence comment usefulness. Our results show that resolution rate varies considerably across agents, with Copilot accounting for the majority of resolved comments (72.9\%). Core developers resolve the majority of agent-generated feedback, particularly for \textit{design} and \textit{evolvability}-related comments, while peripheral developers are more involved in resolving \textit{functional defect} comments. Through open card sorting of 470 unresolved comment discussions, we identify \textit{ten} discussion patterns explaining why comments remain unresolved, with \textit{incorrect suggestions} and \textit{intentional design decisions} being the most prevalent. Finally, our analysis reveals that the presence of an inline \textit{code suggestion} is the strongest predictor of comment resolution, while lengthy and complex comments are less likely to be acted upon. Our findings provide insights for improving AI-generated code review feedback and its integration into development workflows.

Duc Manh Tran, Ratnadira Widyasari, Ivana Clairine Irsan et al.

Ideally, the detailed information about a vulnerability should be made available together with the fixing commit. In practice, however, such details often become available only long after the commit, even when a CVE has already been published. During this window, the patch is already public, so attackers can reverse-engineer it, yet defenders lack the details needed to assess exposure, prioritize, and validate the fix. Executable evidence, such as a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit, could fill this gap. Prior work has automated PoC generation, but the state-of-the-art approach, PoCGen, assumes that a detailed vulnerability report is already available, which is precisely what is missing during this window. In this paper, we first present an empirical study quantifying the long delay between the fixing commit and the availability of a detailed vulnerability report. We then introduce PoCEvolve, a vulnerability-aware prompt-evolution framework that generates PoCs directly from vulnerability-fixing commits. Given a vulnerability-fixing commit, PoCEvolve synthesizes a corresponding PoC exploit. To learn from unsuccessful generation attempts, PoCEvolve assesses the usefulness of different dimensions of vulnerability-related context, including the inferred vulnerable API and code-coverage information. These assessments guide prompt evolution towards more effective exploit-generation prompts. We evaluate PoCEvolve on SecBench.VFC.js, where PoCEvolve achieves a PoC generation success rate of 58.4%, corresponding to relative improvements of 20.7% over PoCGen and 200.0% over the LLM baseline with GPT-4o-mini. With a recent model, Qwen3.7-Plus, PoCEvolve achieves a higher success rate of 85.3%. When detailed vulnerability reports are available, PoCEvolve achieves a success rate of 71.7%, improving over PoCGen by 11.1%.