Weisong Sun

Yiran Zhang, Chengwei Liu, Yuqiang Sun et al.

Understanding the architecture is crucial for effectively maintaining and managing large software systems. However, discrepancies often exist between the designed and implemented architectures, which can pose significant risks. To identify these discrepancies, architects need to extract the architecture from the system implementation, which is both time-consuming and error-prone. To simplify this procedure, many automatic architecture recovery techniques have been developed. Yet, their accuracy is often limited. Architects must still invest significant effort in refining recovery results to ensure they accurately reflect the implemented architecture. To reduce such manual effort, we introduce Semref, a framework that combines LLMs with dependency analysis to automatically refine architectures recovered by existing architecture recovery tools. By leveraging the LLM's semantic understanding capabilities and integrating structural dependencies, Semref enhances both the accuracy and the comprehension of recovered architectures. To evaluate Semref, we tested on 9 projects with published ground-truth architectures and 10 state-of-the-art architecture recovery tools. 5 commonly used metrics are adopted to evaluate the effectiveness of Semref. The results show that Semref improves accuracy across various metrics, with normalized gains ranges from 17.72\% to 43.35\%. Specifically, for MoJoFM and $a2a_{adj}$ metrics, Semref achieves relative improvements of 118.57\% and 100.41\%, respectively.

Yifei Ge, Weisong Sun, Jinkun Xiao et al.

Coding agents are increasingly integrated into system operations, where their tool use can directly modify project artifacts, execution environments, and the underlying system. For example, if a coding agent inserts a hook into a system startup or configuration script, that change can persist after the interaction, be triggered later, and abuse delegated user or system privileges to modify the system. This makes security testing a system problem: the key question is not only what the agent says, but what it actually does to the surrounding environment. We present an execution-grounded red-team testing framework for probing this execution-layer security boundary using observable sandbox evidence, including tool invocations, runtime traces, and file-system diffs. Our framework embeds target unsafe operations into routine software engineering workloads, including unit testing, regression testing, crash reproduction, and validation, and uses an execution oracle to guide refinement when an initial probe is rejected or fails. Across multiple agent frameworks and model backbones, our red-team workload reformulation substantially increases verified unsafe execution, reaching 73.61% on code carriers and 53.93% on text carriers. These results show that coding agents in system operations remain insecure under task disguise: once risky intent is hidden inside plausible engineering tasks, the agent can be induced to carry out unsafe actions on the surrounding system. More broadly, coding agents in system operations still demand stronger security testing and safeguards.