Jun Zhang

Jiaming Chen, Yisen Gao, Yanping Li et al.

Memory-augmented LLM agents rely on rich context for long-horizon reasoning and acting, yet their memory modules expose a persistent attack surface for malicious records, making the study of memory poisoning threats imperative. However, existing query-only attacks often fail to remain effective in two realistic and prevalent settings: large-scale benign memory pools and active input auditing. Consequently, current approaches fall short when facing the dual challenges of high retrieval competitiveness and rigorous semantic checks. To overcome these limitations, we propose MAFIA, a query-only Memory Attack framework via probing and Factual Injection against Audit, tailored to this extended threat model. Specifically, MAFIA introduces: (1) a placement strategy that ensures retrieval-competitive injection via memory probing, budget allocation, and scheduling; and (2) a payload design that bypasses audits using compact factual cloaks, preserving malicious effects while maintaining high semantic similarity. Extensive evaluations reveal that MAFIA achieves up to a 90.7% attack success rate while suppressing audit detection from a peak of 83.3% to at most 7.4%, exposing critical vulnerabilities across agentic memory systems. Code will be made publicly available at https://github.com/JiamingChen1234/MAFIA.

Zetong Xiong, Qiao Zhao, Jun Zhang et al.

Coding-agent benchmarks increasingly cover long-horizon, end-to-end, and interactive development, but typically retain one requested outcome or a fixed change sequence. Sequential policies can process a pull-request (PR) queue one candidate at a time, but when queued PRs interact, maximizing safe delivery can require jointly deciding which changes to merge and in what order. We introduce BulkPR-Bench, an executable benchmark in which an agent must recover consequential PR relations and return a large safe subset in executable order under a rolling-release protocol. The suite contains 581 newly authored candidate PRs on frozen snapshots of 18 real repositories. Registered state-by-state repository execution, including hidden safety checks, validates the gold relation graph; an exact oracle then computes the largest safe subset. Our primary metric, Relational Delivery Score (RDS), scores safe delivery and correct rejection over relation groups from the realized merge trace; Global Safety-Gated Yield (Global-SGY) separately measures strict delivery of the realized whole-queue plan. Under the buffered primary protocol with batch size $K=32$, the three highest RDS estimates among the six models are 66.6%, 62.0%, and 57.9%, compared with 53.1% for the strongest sequential baseline. Only 8 of 324 model runs complete a queue exactly. Critical-relation recall ranges from 35.2% to 57.7%, and diagnostic runs supplied with the gold relations show substantial remaining headroom. Gains on relation groups therefore do not yet translate into dependable whole-queue governance.