Jingyi Wang

Jialuo Chen, Lingqi Jiang, Xinhao Deng et al.

Self-evolving skill (SES) systems distill agent trajectories into persistent skills, allowing untrusted experience to become trusted instruction. We introduce PoisonedEvolution, a trajectory-poisoning attack on this promotion process. Our skill-visible black-box attacker can inspect a target skill and contribute bounded evidence, but cannot observe private pools or evolution logic or edit the skill bank. Artifact poisoning requires Inclusion, Evolution Attribution, and Realization. Attribution is the distinctive bottleneck: the target behavior must appear causally useful, recurrent, and generalizable before promotion. We evaluate four representative security-effect families using inert canary specifications. At 10% attacker support, across six mainstream LLM evolvers in SkillClaw, PoisonedEvolution embeds target behaviors in 546/600 trials (91.0% SER). On the structurally different Trace2Skill pipeline at the same ratio, it embeds target behaviors in 369/600 trials (61.5% SER), demonstrating transfer across evolution architectures. In a representative controlled study, three consistent attacker records suffice in a 30-record batch, whereas a single record is much weaker. Ablations identify recurring support, causal framing, and domain-aligned encoding as the main determinants of success. These findings expose evidence promotion as a security boundary for self-evolving agents.

Jialuo Chen, Minghe Wang, Lingqi Jiang et al.

LLM-agent ecosystems are rapidly growing around reusable skills: mixed-modality packages of metadata, natural-language instructions, code, tools, references, and operational workflows. As skills become marketplace artifacts, auditing their reuse is no longer the same problem as ordinary code clone detection. Existing detectors target single-modality source code or whole-package similarity, yet skill reuse evidence is distributed across authored text, implementation fragments, and operational structure. As a result, they can miss reuse that preserves only one part of a skill. We present SKILLTRACE, a multi-trace provenance auditing framework for LLM-agent skill reuse. SKILLTRACE extracts three provenance traces: Expression, Implementation, and Operational. It represents the Operational Trace as a Skill Operational Graph (SOG) that captures activation, procedure, and resource-flow structure. An LLM assists only the Operational-trace extraction, once at ingestion; at audit time SKILLTRACE compares cached traces deterministically, calibrates each trace against same-function strict negatives, and reports which trace supports a reuse decision. On SKILLTRACE-BENCH, with 820 transformed reuse positives over 100 marketplace anchors and 751 negative controls, SKILLTRACE achieves AUROC 0.938 and F1 0.898. A 36,446-skill wild audit further shows that trace-attributed evidence surfaces actionable reuse review queues beyond repository-level baselines.