Adaptive Resource Allocation in Jamming Teams Using Game Theory
For multi-agent jamming teams, this work provides a game-theoretic framework for resource allocation, but the results are incremental and limited to a specific two-team, two-agent setup.
This paper studies power allocation and adaptive modulation in two-team jamming scenarios, modeling the problem as a zero-sum game and deriving sufficient conditions for pure strategy saddle-point equilibrium.
In this work, we study the problem of power allocation and adaptive modulation in teams of decision makers. We consider the special case of two teams with each team consisting of two mobile agents. Agents belonging to the same team communicate over wireless ad hoc networks, and they try to split their available power between the tasks of communication and jamming the nodes of the other team. The agents have constraints on their total energy and instantaneous power usage. The cost function adopted is the difference between the rates of erroneously transmitted bits of each team. We model the adaptive modulation problem as a zero-sum matrix game which in turn gives rise to a a continuous kernel game to handle power control. Based on the communications model, we present sufficient conditions on the physical parameters of the agents for the existence of a pure strategy saddle-point equilibrium (PSSPE).