Defeating the Kalka--Teicher--Tsaban linear algebra attack on the Algebraic Eraser
This work is incremental, as it improves security for users of the Algebraic Eraser protocol by mitigating a known attack.
The paper addresses the vulnerability of the Algebraic Eraser protocol, specifically the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol, to the Kalka--Teicher--Tsaban linear algebra attack, and proposes a method to select data that prevents this attack.
The Algebraic Eraser (AE) is a public key protocol for sharing information over an insecure channel using commutative and noncommutative groups; a concrete realization is given by Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP). In this paper, we describe how to choose data in CBKAP to thwart an attack by Kalka--Teicher--Tsaban.