Cryptanalysis and enhancement of two low cost rfid authentication protocols
This work addresses security issues in RFID systems, which are critical for applications like patient safety, but it is incremental as it builds on existing protocols.
The paper identified vulnerabilities in two lightweight RFID authentication protocols, showing they are susceptible to de-synchronization attacks and tracking, and proposed solutions to fix these security flaws.
Widespread attention is recently paid upon RFID system structure considering its ease of deployment over an extensive range of applications. Due to its several advantages, many technical articles are published to improve its capabilities over specific system implementations. Recently, a lightweight anti-de-synchronization RFID authentication protocol and a lightweight binding proof protocol to guard patient safety are proposed. This contribution provides enough evidence to prove the first introduced protocol vulnerability to de-synchronization attack. It also provides the other protocol's suffering from de-synchronization attack as well as tracking the movements of the tags. This paper also addresses appropriate solutions to fix the security flaws concerning the two described protocols for secure RFID applications.