Modeling multistage decision processes with Reflexive Game Theory
This addresses decision-making in groups with sequential stages, but it appears incremental as it applies an existing theory to a specific scenario without clear new breakthroughs.
This paper tackles the problem of modeling multistage decision processes by applying Reflexive Game Theory, illustrating a sequential two-stage process where parameters are set in stage 1 and the ultimate decision is implemented in stage 2, with multiple sessions extending it to a multistage process.
This paper introduces application of Reflexive Game Theory to the matter of multistage decision making processes. The idea behind is that each decision making session has certain parameters like "when the session is taking place", "who are the group members to make decision", "how group members influence on each other", etc. This study illustrates the consecutive or sequential decision making process, which consist of two stages. During the stage 1 decisions about the parameters of the ultimate decision making are made. Then stage 2 is implementation of Ultimate decision making itself. Since during stage 1 there can be multiple decision sessions. In such a case it takes more than two sessions to make ultimate (final) decision. Therefore the overall process of ultimate decision making becomes multistage decision making process consisting of consecutive decision making sessions.