Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid-Part II: Cross Layer Detection Mechanism
This addresses security vulnerabilities in smart grids, which are critical for reliable energy infrastructure, but the approach appears incremental as it builds on prior work to detect specific attacks.
The paper tackles the problem of time synchronization attacks in smart grid wide area monitoring systems by proposing a cross-layer detection mechanism, which integrates physical layer GPS spoofing detection with upper-layer power system state evaluation, and verifies its effectiveness through experiments.
A novel time synchronization attack (TSA) on wide area monitoring systems in smart grid has been identified in the first part of this paper. A cross layer detection mechanism is proposed to combat TSA in part II of this paper. In the physical layer, we propose a GPS carrier signal noise ratio (C/No) based spoofing detection technique. In addition, a patch-monopole hybrid antenna is applied to receive GPS signal. By computing the standard deviation of the C/No difference from two GPS receivers, a priori probability of spoofing detection is fed to the upper layer, where power system state is estimated and controlled. A trustworthiness based evaluation method is applied to identify the PMU being under TSA. Both the physical layer and upper layer algorithms are integrated to detect the TSA, thus forming a cross layer mechanism. Experiment is carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed TSA detection algorithm.