Constrained Automated Mechanism Design for Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
This work addresses the challenge of designing mechanisms for strategic interactions in incomplete information settings, offering a promising parametric approach, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing game models.
The authors tackled the problem of automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information by developing a functional framework with a black-box optimization algorithm, resulting in optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms that improved on best-known ones in some cases.
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information. At the core of our framework is a black-box optimization algorithm which guides the selection process of candidate mechanisms. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in several application domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we provide evidence that ours is a promising approach to parametric design of indirect mechanisms.