On the post-quantum security of encrypted key exchange protocols
This addresses security vulnerabilities in key exchange protocols for cryptography users in a post-quantum era, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing EKE protocols with specific quantum assumptions.
The paper tackled the post-quantum security of encrypted key exchange protocols, showing that a 40-bit password version is secure against quantum adversaries using ion-trap quantum computers, and introduced a password encrypted no-key protocol resistant to middle-man attacks with proven post-quantum security.
We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack, and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis presented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of various hybrid cryptosystems.