Single-shot security for one-time memories in the isolated qubits model
This addresses the problem of secure cryptographic devices for applications like one-time programs, representing an incremental improvement over prior work in quantum cryptography.
The paper tackled constructing one-time memories (OTMs) with security based on physical principles, specifically using isolated qubits, and achieved stronger single-shot security guarantees with efficient implementability.
One-time memories (OTM's) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTM's whose security follows from some physical principle? This is not possible in a fully-classical world, or in a fully-quantum world, but there is evidence that OTM's can be built using "isolated qubits" -- qubits that cannot be entangled, but can be accessed using adaptive sequences of single-qubit measurements. Here we present new constructions for OTM's using isolated qubits, which improve on previous work in several respects: they achieve a stronger "single-shot" security guarantee, which is stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy; they are proven secure against adversaries who can perform arbitrary local operations and classical communication (LOCC); and they are efficiently implementable. These results use Wiesner's idea of conjugate coding, combined with error-correcting codes that approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and a high-order entropic uncertainty relation, which was originally developed for cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model.