A Framework for Hybrid Systems with Denial-of-Service Security Attack
This addresses safety-critical issues in hybrid systems like transportation or industrial control for engineers and researchers, but it is incremental as it builds on existing formal methods for hybrid systems.
The paper tackles the problem of ensuring safety in hybrid systems under denial-of-service security attacks by proposing a formal framework that allows physical systems to plan for alternative behaviors when ideal control fails, guaranteeing safety without environmental assumptions, and implements an interactive theorem prover applied to a train control example.
Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system.