Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say?
This addresses a security flaw in a specific cryptographic scheme, but it is incremental as it corrects an existing error rather than introducing new methods.
The paper refutes a physical model by Gunn, Allison, and Abbott (GAA) for eavesdropping on KLJN secure key distribution, showing it is flawed due to violations of fundamental physics laws, and provides a corrected model based on impedances at the quasi-static limit.
We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [arXiv:1402.2709v2], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Principle of Detailed Balance, Boltzmann's Energy Equipartition Theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.