Classical leakage resilience from fault-tolerant quantum computation
This work addresses leakage resilience in cryptography, offering a novel approach by leveraging quantum fault tolerance, but it appears incremental as it builds on existing quantum methods.
The paper tackles the problem of secure computation against side-channel attacks by establishing a connection between leakage resilience and fault-tolerant quantum computation, proving that fault tolerance implies leakage resilience for general leakage models and enabling secure classical circuit implementations.
Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information, which makes them vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks. The problem of secure computation in the presence of leakage is generally known as leakage resilience. In this work, we establish a connection between leakage resilience and fault-tolerant quantum computation. We first prove that for a general leakage model, there exists a corresponding noise model in which fault tolerance implies leakage resilience. Then we show how to use constructions for fault-tolerant quantum computation to implement classical circuits that are secure in specific leakage models.