The Utility and Practicality of Quantifying Software Reliability
This addresses the challenge of software reliability quantification for safety-critical systems, but it is incremental as it builds on existing risk management concepts without introducing new methods.
The paper tackles the problem of quantifying software reliability to demonstrate that system-level risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), showing it is possible in at least one meaningful case but often impractical, which may cause standards to miss risk-reduction opportunities.
We argue that quantifying software reliability is important in demonstrating that system-level risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Furthermore, we demonstrate that such quantification is possible in at least one meaningful case. It is, however, unlikely to be practical in every case. This means it is unlikely to be included as an explicit objective in standards. Hence, for those cases where software reliability can be quantified, merely following a standard may lead to risk-reduction opportunities being missed.