CRGRJan 6, 2015

Linear decomposition attack on public key exchange protocols using semidirect products of (semi)groups

arXiv:1501.01152v120 citations
Originality Synthesis-oriented
AI Analysis

This work exposes a security vulnerability in specific cryptographic protocols, making it incremental as it applies an existing attack method to new targets.

The authors tackled the problem of breaking public key exchange protocols based on semidirect products of (semi)groups by applying a linear decomposition attack, successfully finding the exchanged secret keys in all main protocols proposed by Kahrobaei et al.

We show that a linear decomposition attack based on the decomposition method introduced by the author works by finding the exchanged secret keys in all main protocols using semidirect products of (semi)grops proposed by Kahrobaei, Shpilrain, Habeeb, Koupparis and Lam.

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