Proposal for Quantum Rational Secret Sharing
This addresses a security issue in quantum cryptography for scenarios with self-interested parties, representing a novel extension rather than an incremental improvement.
The paper tackles the problem of rational participants in quantum secret sharing, where existing schemes fail because they assume a dealer-chosen reconstructor; the proposed scheme is fair, correct, and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
A rational secret sharing scheme is a game in which each party responsible for reconstructing a secret tries to maximize his utility by obtaining the secret alone. Quantum secret sharing schemes, either derived from quantum teleportation or from quantum error correcting code, do not succeed when we assume rational participants. This is because all existing quantum secret sharing schemes consider that the secret is reconstructed by a party chosen by the dealer. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a quantum secret sharing scheme which is resistant to rational parties. The proposed scheme is fair (everyone gets the secret), correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.