Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence
This addresses the philosophical problem of ascribing consciousness to AI for researchers in cognitive science and AI ethics, but it is incremental as it builds on existing debates without new empirical results.
The paper critiques the anti-functionalist stance of integrated information theory (IIT) regarding consciousness in AI, using thought experiments and highlighting tensions in IIT's approach, ultimately suggesting that both IIT and functionalism contribute to understanding consciousness without solving metaphysical issues.
This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as bringing out tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe consciousness to it.