On the Security of MTA-OTIBASs (Multiple-TA One-Time Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures)
This work addresses security concerns for cryptographic systems using aggregate signatures, but it is incremental as it builds on an existing scheme.
The paper tackles the security of a multiple-TA one-time identity-based aggregate signature scheme by proving that the proposed concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks under the co-CDH problem assumption in the random oracle model.
In [3] the authors proposed a new aggregate signature scheme referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further, they gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We recall here the definition of MTA-OTIBAS and the concrete proposed scheme. Then we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.