Transaction Remote Release (TRR): A New Anonymization Technology for Bitcoin
This work addresses anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin for users and systems, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing anonymization methods like TOR to target a specific gap in ABPN defense.
The paper tackles the problem of Bitcoin transaction deanonymization by addressing Analysis of Bitcoin Protocol and Network (ABPN) attacks, which have received little prior research, and proposes Transaction Remote Release (TRR) as a new anonymization technology that effectively counters these attacks with good encryption performance and limited cipher growth.
The anonymity of the Bitcoin system has some shortcomings. Analysis of Transaction Chain (ATC) and Analysis of Bitcoin Protocol and Network (ABPN) are two important methods of deanonymizing bitcoin transactions. Nowadays, there are some anonymization methods to combat ATC but there has been little research into ways to counter ABPN. This paper proposes a new anonymization technology called Transaction Remote Release (TRR). Inspired by The Onion Router (TOR), TRR is able to render several typical attacking methods of ABPN ineffective. Furthermore, the performance of encryption and decryption of TRR is good and the growth rate of the cipher is very limited. Hence, TRR is suited for practical applications.