How to Incentivize Data-Driven Collaboration Among Competing Parties
This addresses the challenge of enabling data-driven collaboration in fields like healthcare and finance where parties are reluctant to share due to privacy and competition, offering a solution to improve collective outcomes while ensuring individual benefits.
The paper tackles the problem of incentivizing data collaboration among competing parties by formalizing a model where participants receive outputs sequentially based on private inputs, and it shows that achieving collaborative equilibrium is NP-complete but provides efficient algorithms for natural settings, with decentralized implementations using secure multiparty computation extensions.
The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop educational strategies. In some settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep learning, sheer size of data seems critical. When data is held distributedly by many parties, they must share it to reap its full benefits. One obstacle to this revolution is the lack of willingness of different parties to share data, due to reasons such as loss of privacy or competitive edge. Cryptographic works address privacy aspects, but shed no light on individual parties' losses/gains when access to data carries tangible rewards. Even if it is clear that better overall conclusions can be drawn from collaboration, are individual collaborators better off by collaborating? Addressing this question is the topic of this paper. * We formalize a model of n-party collaboration for computing functions over private inputs in which participants receive their outputs in sequence, and the order depends on their private inputs. Each output "improves" on preceding outputs according to a score function. * We say a mechanism for collaboration achieves collaborative equilibrium if it ensures higher reward for all participants when collaborating (rather than working alone). We show that in general, computing a collaborative equilibrium is NP-complete, yet we design efficient algorithms to compute it in a range of natural model settings. Our collaboration mechanisms are in the standard model, and thus require a central trusted party; however, we show this assumption is unnecessary under standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how to implement the mechanisms in a decentralized way with new extensions of secure multiparty computation that impose order/timing constraints on output delivery to different players, as well as privacy and correctness.