On the Vulnerability of Digital Fingerprinting Systems to Finite Alphabet Collusion Attacks
This addresses security risks for digital content protection systems, but it is incremental as it builds on existing collusion attack methods.
The paper tackles the vulnerability of digital fingerprinting systems by proposing a novel non-linear collusion attack that requires fewer colluders to defeat the scheme, with simulation results showing it is more powerful in practice than theoretical bounds predicted.
This paper proposes a novel, non-linear collusion attack on digital fingerprinting systems. The attack is proposed for fingerprinting systems with finite alphabet but can be extended to continuous alphabet. We analyze the error probability of the attack for some classes of proposed random and deterministic schemes and obtain a bound on the number of colluders necessary to correctly estimate the host signal. That is, it requires fewer number of colluders to defeat the fingerprinting scheme. Our simulation results show that our attack is more powerful in practice than predicted by the theoretical bound.