Threshold-Dependent Camouflaged Cells to Secure Circuits Against Reverse Engineering Attacks
This addresses security vulnerabilities in chip design for industries relying on intellectual property protection, representing a novel method rather than an incremental improvement.
The paper tackles the problem of reverse engineering attacks on integrated circuits by proposing threshold-dependent camouflaged cells that are structurally identical regardless of functionality, with circuit simulations showing they can cost-effectively and robustly camouflage large netlists and operate as expected over all PVT corners.
With current tools and technology, someone who has physical access to a chip can extract the detailed layout of the integrated circuit (IC). By using advanced visual imaging techniques, reverse engineering can reveal details that are meant to be kept secret, such as a secure protocol or novel implementation that offers a competitive advantage. A promising solution to defend against reverse engineering attacks is IC camouflaging. In this work, we propose a new camouflaging technique based on the threshold voltage of the transistors. We refer to these cells as threshold dependent camouflaged cells. Our work differs from current commercial solutions in that the latter use look-alike cells, with the assumption that it is difficult for the reverse engineer to identify the cell's functionality. Yet, if a structural distinction between cells exists, then these are still vulnerable, especially as reverse engineers use more advanced and precise techniques. On the other hand, the proposed threshold dependent standard cells are structurally identical regardless of the cells' functionality. Detailed circuit simulations of our proposed threshold dependent camouflaged cells demonstrate that they can be used to cost-effectively and robustly camouflage large netlists. Corner analysis of process, temperature, and supply voltage (PVT) variations show that our cells operate as expected over all PVT corners simulated.