Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
This work corrects misconceptions in security analysis for quantum-resistant key distribution systems, but it is incremental as it builds on prior defenses.
The paper addresses a transient attack on the KLJN secure key exchange system, clarifying invalid statements in a prior work and noting that a new version of the KLJN system is immune to all existing attacks.
A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.