Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice
This work addresses the challenge of designing effective human-agent interactions, though it appears incremental by applying existing theories to specific negotiation scenarios.
The paper investigates whether game theory and logic-based strategies can enable automated agents to interact proficiently with humans in negotiation settings like bargaining and deliberation, finding that equilibrium-based agents offer benefits in these contexts.
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.