On Strategic Multi-Antenna Jamming in Centralized Detection Networks
This addresses security in detection networks for applications like surveillance or communication systems, but it is incremental as it extends game theory to a specific jamming scenario.
The paper models a zero-sum game between a centralized detection network and a multi-antenna jammer, showing that at Nash equilibrium with pure strategies, the jammer has no impact on the fusion center's error probability, but mixed strategies do affect expected utility.
In this paper, we model a complete-information zero-sum game between a centralized detection network with a multiple access channel (MAC) between the sensors and the fusion center (FC), and a jammer with multiple transmitting antennas. We choose error probability at the FC as the performance metric, and investigate pure strategy equilibria for this game, and show that the jammer has no impact on the FC's error probability by employing pure strategies at the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we also show that the jammer has an impact on the expected utility if it employs mixed strategies.