The feasibility of launching physical layer attacks in visible light communication networks
This addresses security vulnerabilities in VLC networks, which are often touted as secure, but the work is incremental as it builds on known concerns about physical layer threats.
The paper tackles the security of visible light communication (VLC) networks by examining physical layer attacks, finding that rogue transmitters can easily disrupt or hijack legitimate transmissions, with effectiveness measured by Bit Error Rate (BER).
One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS - "What You See Is What You Send". However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission.