On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
This work exposes vulnerabilities in a specific encryption scheme, which is incremental as it critiques an existing method without proposing a new solution.
This paper identifies multiple security flaws in a chaos-based image encryption scheme, including invalid/weak keys, a chosen-plaintext attack that can break part of the key with up to 128 chosen images, and a known-plaintext attack that recovers visual information with one known image when a subkey is small.
This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme, and points out the following problems: 1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; 2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey $K_{10}$ can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; 3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: $\{K_i\bmod 128\}_{i=4}^{10}$, which works very well when $K_{10}$ is not too large; 4) when $K_{10}$ is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.