The Emergence of Organizing Structure in Conceptual Representation
This addresses the challenge of understanding the computational underpinnings of structure discovery in cognitive science, offering a more flexible approach than previous methods that assumed specific structural forms.
The paper tackles the problem of how organizing structure emerges in conceptual representation by introducing a computational model that uses a broad hypothesis space with a preference for sparse connectivity, enabling it to learn complex structures for domains lacking intuitive description and predict human property induction judgments without explicit structural forms.
Both scientists and children make important structural discoveries, yet their computational underpinnings are not well understood. Structure discovery has previously been formalized as probabilistic inference about the right structural form --- where form could be a tree, ring, chain, grid, etc. [Kemp & Tenenbaum (2008). The discovery of structural form. PNAS, 105(3), 10687-10692]. While this approach can learn intuitive organizations, including a tree for animals and a ring for the color circle, it assumes a strong inductive bias that considers only these particular forms, and each form is explicitly provided as initial knowledge. Here we introduce a new computational model of how organizing structure can be discovered, utilizing a broad hypothesis space with a preference for sparse connectivity. Given that the inductive bias is more general, the model's initial knowledge shows little qualitative resemblance to some of the discoveries it supports. As a consequence, the model can also learn complex structures for domains that lack intuitive description, as well as predict human property induction judgments without explicit structural forms. By allowing form to emerge from sparsity, our approach clarifies how both the richness and flexibility of human conceptual organization can coexist.