The formal-logical characterisation of lies, deception, and associated notions
This work addresses the problem of enabling intelligent agents to operate in untrustworthy environments by formally defining dishonesty, but it is incremental as it reviews and critiques existing literature without introducing new methods.
The paper reviewed formal definitions of dishonest notions like lies and deception using modal logic and other approaches, assessing them against philosophical criteria, and found that only a few definitions fully meet the standard while highlighting gaps for practical application in agent environments.
Defining various dishonest notions in a formal way is a key step to enable intelligent agents to act in untrustworthy environments. This review evaluates the literature for this topic by looking at formal definitions based on modal logic as well as other formal approaches. Criteria from philosophical groundwork is used to assess the definitions for correctness and completeness. The key contribution of this review is to show that only a few definitions fully comply with this gold standard and to point out the missing steps towards a successful application of these definitions in an actual agent environment.