AIJan 12, 2017

A Savage-Like Axiomatization for Nonstandard Expected Utility

arXiv:1701.03500v7
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AI Analysis

This work addresses foundational issues in decision theory for researchers, but it is incremental as it extends existing axiomatizations.

The paper tackles the problem of providing a Savage-like axiomatization for nonstandard expected utility theory, achieving this by weakening Savage's 6th axiom.

Since Leonard Savage's epoch-making "Foundations of Statistics", Subjective Expected Utility Theory has been the presumptive model for decision-making. Savage provided an act-based axiomatization of standard expected utility theory. In this article, we provide a Savage-like axiomatization of nonstandard expected utility theory. It corresponds to a weakening of Savage's 6th axiom.

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