Networked Systems under Denial-of-Service: Co-located vs. Remote Control Architectures
For control engineers designing networked systems under DoS attacks, this work provides a practical remote architecture that balances robustness and cost, though the improvement is incremental over known co-located designs.
This paper studies networked control systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, proposing a remote control architecture that approximates co-located control. It quantifies the robustness gap between the two architectures, showing that the proposed remote architecture can achieve similar stability guarantees with reduced cost and increased flexibility.
In this paper, we study networked systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication network. Previous studies have shown that co-located architectures (control unit co-located with the actuators and networked sensor channel) can ensure a high level of robustness against DoS. However, co-location requires a wired or dedicated actuator channel, which could not meet flexibility and cost requirements. In this paper we consider a control architecture that approximates co-location while enabling remote implementation (networked sensor and actuator channels). We analyze closed-loop stability and quantify the robustness "gap" between this architecture and the co-located one.