Oops!...I think I scanned a malware
This addresses a cybersecurity vulnerability for organizations by showing how physical devices can be exploited for data exfiltration, though it is a proof-of-concept with incremental implications.
The paper demonstrates a covert channel attack where malware communicates with a command-and-control server by exploiting a flatbed scanner's light sensitivity, using light sources like lasers or smart bulbs to infiltrate data from distances up to 900 meters, including triggering ransomware attacks in experiments.
This article presents a proof-of-concept illustrating the feasibility of creating a covert channel between a C\&C server and a malware installed in an organization by exploiting an organization's scanner and using it as a means of interaction. We take advantage of the light sensitivity of a flatbed scanner, using a light source to infiltrate data to an organization. We present an implementation of the method for different purposes (even to trigger a ransomware attack) in various experimental setups using: (1) a laser connected to a stand (2) a laser carried by a drone, and (3) a hijacked smart bulb within the targeted organization from a passing car. In our experiments we were able to infiltrate data using different types of light sources (including infrared light), from a distance of up to 900 meters away from the scanner. We discuss potential counter measures to prevent the attack.