Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences
For mechanism designers allocating multiple objects without money, the paper provides a more appealing solution with stronger fairness and incentive properties.
The paper studies multi-unit allocation under dichotomous preferences, showing that the egalitarian solution is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, group strategy-proof, and can satisfy a new fairness axiom, outperforming the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes.
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.