Secure Location-Aided Routing Protocols With Wi-Fi Direct For Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
This addresses security threats in vehicular networks for applications like traffic safety, but it is incremental as it builds on existing LAR protocols with added authentication.
The authors tackled secure routing in vehicular ad hoc networks by integrating a modified Diffie-Hellman key agreement with Location-Aided Routing protocols over Wi-Fi Direct, resulting in superior performance in secure data delivery and reduced average packet delay compared to baseline schemes.
Secure routing protocols are proposed for the vehicular ad hoc networks. The protocols integrate the security authentication process with the Location-Aided Routing (LAR) protocol to support Wi-Fi Direct communications between the vehicles. The methods are robust against various security threats. The security authentication process adopts a modified Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used with a short authentication string (SAS)-based key agreement over Wi-Fi Direct out-of-band communication channels. It protects the communication from any man-in-the-middle security threats. In particular, the security process is integrated into two LAR routing schemes, i.e., the request-zone LAR scheme and the distance-based LAR scheme. We conduct extensive simulations with different network parameters such as the vehicular node density, the number of the malicious nodes, and the speed of the nodes. Simulation results show that the proposed routing protocols provide superior performance in secure data delivery and average total packet delay. Also, the secure distance-based LAR protocol outperforms the secure request-zone LAR protocol.