A quantum key distribution protocol for rapid denial of service detection
This addresses denial-of-service vulnerabilities in quantum key distribution systems, which is an incremental improvement for quantum cryptography applications.
The paper tackles the problem of denial-of-service attacks in quantum key distribution by introducing a protocol that exposes fake users and resists secret exhaustion, achieving 100% efficiency regardless of qubit count above the finite key limit and enabling secure key generation from two-photon pulses without extra modifications.
We introduce a quantum key distribution protocol designed to expose fake users that connect to Alice or Bob for the purpose of monopolising the link and denying service. It inherently resists attempts to exhaust Alice and Bob's initial shared secret, and is 100% efficient, regardless of the number of qubits exchanged above the finite key limit. Additionally, secure key can be generated from two-photon pulses, without having to make any extra modifications. This is made possible by relaxing the security of BB84 to that of the quantum-safe block cipher used for day-to-day encryption, meaning the overall security remains unaffected for useful real-world cryptosystems such as AES-GCM being keyed with quantum devices.